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Abstract
This article rationalizes the crossholdings of debt and equity within
the Japanese financial keiretsu as a private enforcement mechanism. Our
rationale complements previous explanations on the economic efficiency of
the keiretsu by suggesting an explicit mechanism through which cooperation
is sustained over time. The allocation of control rights implicit in its
financial structure is shown to support relational contracting among self-
interested managers through tacit threats of expulsion from control. The
mode of enforcement shifts from mutual enforcement among group members to a
more hierarchical mode under main bank leadership when a firm moves into
financial distress.
The model is consistent with the extent of preferential intragroup trading,
the remarkable stability of the structure of financial keiretsu over time
and the pattern of corporate reorganization observed within the groups.
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1 Introduction
Most larger firms in Japan are affiliated with a financial keiretsu.
The main features of these groupings are extensive intragroup trade and a
capital structure with elaborate crossholdings of debt and equity, a strong
domination for the group's main bank in corporate borrowing, and high
levels of gearing in member firms. This article analyses the peculiar
pattern of control allocation in the financial keiretsu as a collective
(but privately organized) enforcement mechanism designed to facilitate
transactions between member firms. We suggest that the pattern of financial
contracting within the groups implies that the mode of enforcing coopera-
tion in transactions is contingent on firm~ performance. When the firm is
doing well, enforcement is achieved collectively through the reciprocal
shareholdings. In states with low performance, control rights are trans-
ferred to creditors, and enforcement is shifted to a more hierarchical form
with the group's main bank as the chief actor.
In most complex transactions conflicts are bound to occur. Trading agents
cannot easily anticipate and ex ante resolve contractually all potential
conflicts. Even if they could foresee all relevant contingencies, contrac-
tual agreements may not satisfactorily be enforced by a public court,
either because relevant variables are not verifiable by a third party or
because agreements are of a kind which are not enforceable by a court. In
these situations, some other arrangement must resolve the indeterminacy of
the allocation: agents may delegate the right to make allocative decisions
in contingencies not contracted upon to one of the parties (residual
control rights) or to third party arbitration (see Tirole, 1988).
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We interpret the Japanese financial keiretsu as an intermediate
mechanism where agents in a coalition enjoy control rights only conditional
on collective approval, thus creating a mutual enforcement mechanism for
resolution of bilateral and multilateral conflicts. We suggest that this
arrangement may support a broad range of functions which have been identi-
fied in the literature on the keiretsu, such as facilitating bilateral
trade between member firms, and encouraging investment in relation-specific
assets. The financial keiretsu may also allow credible exchange of informa-
tion or coordinate research efforts, and enforce timely and coordinated
reorganization of firms in financial distress.
In principle, the same private mechanism we describe could also be
used to support entrenchment in the form o\f mutual takeover defence and
inefficient risk-sharing among member firms. In fact, our rationale does
not necessarily contradict any of the previous explanations. Rather, by
analysing the allocation of control within the financial keiretsu, we
provide a "missing link", an explicit governance mechanism, and attempt to
explain their stability over time.
The predictions of our model are in general agreement with the
structure and composition of the groups in terms of number and size of
member firms as well as their dispersion across industries. In particular,
the analysis highlights the significance of the regular meetings between
representatives of group companies. They serve both as loci for coordina-
tion of intragroup transactions, permitting exchange of information or
governance of joint research projects, as well as private courts which
ensure compliance within cooperative arrangements.
The article starts out with a brief history and characterization of
the financial keiretsu, emphasizing how financial contracts allocate
property rights. The second section discusses previous explanations for the
2
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existence of the financial keiretsu. In the third section our rationale for
the crossholding arrangement and the internal lending relationships is out-
lined. We then compare our justification for the groups with empirical
observations and previous explanations. The final section discusses the
wider implications of our interpretation for the understanding of Japanese
business practices and society.
2 Legal Informality and the Financial Keiretsu
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of the Japanese legal system is
the predominance of informal conflict resolution.2 Legal informality in
Japan is reflected in relatively low level's of litigation, in particular in
comparison with the United States.3 The informal nature of conflict reso-
lution is perhaps even more pronounced in the commercial sector. Prior to
the Meiji restoration in 1868, contracts played little or no role in
commercial transactions (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1979). In the reform and
modernization of Japanese society, a number of legal concepts and institu-
tions were imported, primarily from German civil law tradition. However,
public enforcement based on contracts never took root in Japanese commer-
cial life. Transactions were enforced chiefly through reputation and
hierarchical enforcement in the family-controlled zaibatsu groupings, i.e.,
strategic decisions were often made, and management appointed and fired, by
the family-controlled holding company. These groups of firms emerged around
the large trading houses in 19th century Japan. Their importance grew
steadily and peaked in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Following World War
II, the zaibatsu groups were dismantled under the US occupation in an
attempt to reform the Japanese economic and political system. The goal was
to establish a public enforcement system based on US precedent. The
3
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Commercial Code, for example, was modelled directly on state legislation in
the United States. Furthermore, the US administration dissolved the holding
companies under the control of the zaibatsu families and largely eliminated
other ownership ties within the groups. Several thousand managers were
fired, and family-held equity was confiscated and distributed to the
general public.4
Interestingly, these reforms seem to have had little impact on how
commercial transactions were undertaken and enforced ex post. The early
fifties saw a brief period of widely held firms, but by the mid-sixties the
zaibatsu groupings had been reincarnated in the shape of the financial
keiretsu. The family-controlled holding companies were replaced by a
complex network of reciprocal shareholdings. The previous zaibatsu banks
and the large commercial banks, the so-called city banks, played a central
role in the restoration of the groupings. Several government institutions
were also actively involved in this process. Figure 1 illustrates how a
more horizontal arrangement has taken the place of the hierarchical
structure of the pre-WW II zaibatsu.
4
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Figure 1 Zaibatsu and Financial Keiretsu Compared*
THE ZAIDATSU GROtlPINGS DEFORE WOFRLD vWR II
( "~ Family-controlled
holding company
Core companies
Subsld lary
~,--J . ~ ~ "--.J ~ companies
POST-WAR FINANCIAL KEIRETSU
anles
mpany
*Arrows indicate ownership ties. Double arrows indicate cross-shareholdin- '.
gs. The enlarged square indicates that a group firm can also be a member of
an industrial keiretsu.
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Most firms listed on the Japanese stock exchanges are members of a finan-
cial keiretsu5 (for thorough discussions of these arrangements, see Clark
(1979), Sheard (1986), and Aoki (1988)). Member firms (20-45 in the larger
keiretsu) are interconnected through a complex network of reciprocal
ownership as well as lender-borrower and buyer-seller relationships (see
Table 1).6 Within the financial keiretsu, there are also personal inter-
lockings in the form of a limited exchange of board directors.7 Further-
more, representatives on different levels in the core companies meet on a
regular basis in the so-called Presidents' Clubs8.
Intragroup
(1985)
Mitsui
Financing Patterns in Leading Financial Groups
Mitsu- Sumi- \ Sanwa Fuyo Dai-Ichi
bishi tomo Kangyo
Number
of firms
Group
members'
share of
total group
equity
Group
bank's
share of
total bank
finance in
group
companies
24 28
18 25
21 22
21
25
28
44
17
20
29
16
18
47
13
12
Source: Aoki, Masahiko, 1988, Information, Incentives and Bargaining in
the Japanese Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Each financial keiretsu typically has one member company in every important
industry and attempts to avoid direct competition between group companies
(Clark, 1979). The division of labor is well developed, and there is a
strong preference among member firms for intragroup trade 9. The most
6
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advanced specialization and the strongest cohesion can be found in the
financial keiretsu which have emerged around the old zaibatsu banks, i.e.,
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. In the following we concentrate on the
financial keiretsu as an allocation of property rights defined by the
financial contracts connecting individual group members. These financial
linkages within the groups can be illustrated by Figures 2 and 3, depicting
the lending and shareholding ties, respectively, within the Sumitomo
financial keiretsu.
7
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Figure 2: Intragroup Lending Patterns in the Sumitomo Group*
(excluding trade credits)
tarne
£att
Main lender
Loans in excess of 10% of company's borrowed capital (but not main
lender)
Loans of 1-10% of company's borrowed' capital
* SIT = Sumitomo
Sctirce: Gerlach, Michael, 1987, "Business Alliances and the Strategy of the Japanese
Firm," California Management Review (Fall)
%%"
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Intragroup Shareholdings in the Sumitomo Group
5 per cent or more and tlhe hlirgst Owner
5 per cent or nlore or less than 5 per cent and the largest owner
one of the ten largest shareholders but lcss than 5 per cent
small, reciprocal shareholdings
Source: Gerlach, Michael, 1987, "Business Alliances and the Strategy of the
Japanese Firm," Califrnia Management Review (Fall).
The figures demonstrate the strategic role of the main bank, here
Sumitomo Bank, as the chief lender to member firms and one of the most
important shareholders. 10 According to Table 1, the main bank on average
covered between 12 and 28 per cent of group members' bank loans in 1985.
The group trading house is instrumental in providing short and medium-term
finance and in mediating intragroup trade. Like the main bank, the trading
house assists problem firms within the group.
The most conspicuous feature of these groups is the extensive cross-
shareholdings among firms. The combined holdings of group companies are
usually sufficient to guarantee a voting majority in every member firm.
9
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However, each group member's ownership share in a particular firm is
small, typically 2-5 per cent. Table 1 showed the extent of crossholdings
in the six largest groups. If we take into account that shareholdings of
individuals are typically dispersed, the importance of intragroup holdings
of equity becomes even more striking. Table 2 depicts only the 20 largest
shareholdings among the 100 largest manufacturing companies and the 23
largest financial institutions.
Table 2 Crossholdings of Shares Within the Financial Keiretsu
Issuing Compy Owing Coman
Mitsui Mitsu- Sumi- Fuji'
bishi tomo
Mitsui (12) 55.2 5.4 7.3 4.9
Mitsubishi (13) 1.7 74.2 0.8 3.8
Sumitomo (10) 1.7 0.3 68.8 3.6
Fuji (14) 3.5 6.4 6.8 49.2
Dai-Ichi (10) 4.2 9.1 4.7 \ 6.2
Sanwa (12) 3.2 5.6 2.6 12.7
Sanwa Independent
1.0
0.2
. 4.9
2.4
32.8
25.2
14.8
23.9
23.6
31.1
31.8
Independent (12) 11.2 13.0 -9.8 9.2 9.5 7.2 40.0
The figure indicates the shares held within groups (underlined) and between groups as
well as between independent firms. The data comprises only the 20 largest owners in
each company. The sample covers only the 100 largest non-financial corporations and
the 23 largest financial corporations. (Within paranthesis you find the number of
firms in ca:ch category).
Source: Futasugi (1976) referred to in Michael Gerlach (1986)
"'lnstitutionalized Markets: (Corporate ontrol and
largc-Firim Organization in Japan," Yale University
(unpublished workinpg T:pcer).
Shareholdings in Japan are remarkably stable (Clark, 1979). Banks, trading
houses, and group-affiliated insurance companies serve as so-called stable
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shareholders. Such shareholders purchase large portions of new issues of
member firms' shares with the implicit, and sometimes explicit, understand-
ing that they will not be sold on the market without prior consultation of
the issuing firm. As a result, the bulk of shares listed on Japanese
exchanges are never traded. 1 The stable shareholdings are also important
when, as is common in Japan, a firm may have to dispose of its share-
holdings to offset business losses (Sheard (1986) documents a large number
of such transactions). Furthermore, to maintain the ownership and control
structure of the groupings, member firms purchase new issues of shares in
proportion to previous holdings.
Companies which are part of financial keiretsu have also generally
been more highly leveraged than independent companies (Nakatani, 1984).
Furthermore, trade credits are a relatively more important source of credit
than in, for example, the United States;12 the extensive use of such
credits gives rise to a peculiar structure of crosslending.
3 Previous Interpretations
A fairly rich literature has attempted to explain the existence and the
specific structure of the financial keiretsu (for a thorough economic
analysis, see Aoki (1988). This section reviews some of these contribu-
tions. For expositional purposes, we distinguish between rationales arguing
that the keiretsu pursues enhanced economic performance and those that view
it primarily as examples of successful entrenchment by insider stakehol-
ders. However, these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
In fact, as also argued by Dore (1986) and others, entrenchment may serve
to improve efficiency by allowing long-term planning and by preventing
disruptive takeovers.
11
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3.1 Economic Performance Rationales
Superior performance may be attributed either to enhanced market
power or to efficiency advantages. In a traditional market power argument,
the coalition enables member firms to keep higher prices by controlling
output. While this argument may help explain other institutional arrange-
ments in Japan, such as industry organizations, it hardly seems appropriate
for the financial keiretsu. The keiretsu are carefully organized across
industries and apparently do not establish monopoly power in individual
markets.
Caves & Uekusa (1976) suggest that in an imperfect market the
keiretsu could still utilize market power 'by trading at a two-tier price
schedule with one set of prices aimed towards other group members and
another set towards outsiders. Intragroup trade would occur at price ratios
equal to internal marginal opportunity costs, while group members would
utilize their market power in trade with outside companies.13 This expla-
nation helps explain the preference among group companies for intragroup
trade. However, purely contractual forms of mutual compensation may also
encourage such trade even without involving mutual property rights. In
addition, intragroup trade aimed at establishing market presence may have
been a main driving force behind the formation of the pre-WW II zaibatsu
and their reemergence after the war, but it is likely to be only one aspect
of the complex relationships among firms within the financial keiretsu.
The financial keiretsu could also be viewed as arrangements intended
to enhance the members' bargaining strength vis-a-vis other companies and
the central government. This appears plausible for the period following WW
II when there was significant government control over, among other things,
the allocation of credit and foreign exchange. However, the development of
12
- I------- _8~··~)·lll
_________ I
the financial keiretsu occurred at a later stage, when these constraints
were being relaxed. While subsidies may still be significant in some
segments of industry, this corporatist bargaining argument is insufficient
as the main justification for the groups in their present form.
A number of contributions have rationalized the arrangement as profit
maximizing through transaction costs savings. Goto (1982) suggests that the
groups economize on contracting costs by facilitating the transfer of
information. According to this explanation, strategic information is
exchanged in the Presidents' Clubs and other fora for group interaction to
facilitate the coordination of decision-making within the keiretsu.
However, to be credible, such an exchange of information and strategic
coordination must be supported by some enforcement mechanism preventing
deviations by individual members.
In a similar vein, Hoshi et al (1990a and b), among others, view the
groups as primarily financial arrangements mitigating information and
incentive problems when investors are diffused. Their empirical evidence
suggests that firms within the financial keiretsu have been less liquidity-
constrained than independent companies. This is explained by better
monitoring opportunities within the keiretsu as a result of the long-term
relationships between group banks and member companies. 14 The concen-
tration of financial claims to a few banks improves incentives for monitor-
ing. While an informational interpretation offers a plausible rationale for
the concentrated creditor structure and the close relationship between
banks and group companies, it does not explain the presence of elaborate
crossholdings of equity. However, the exchange of information is apparently '
an important function of the groups; we argue that it is the existence of
elaborate crossholdings of debt and equity that makes this exchange
credible.
13
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In general, these explanations lack an explicit model of the gover-
nance structure of the arrangement, nor do they address the complex
allocation of property rights implied by the pattern of financing within
the group.
3.2 Entrenchment Rationales
Entrenchment arguments assume that the financial keiretsu allow
management or employees to reduce risk 15 or obtain private benefits from
control. Aoki (1984 and 1988) argues that the financial keiretsu should be
viewed as risk sharing arrangements which have emerged in response to the
absence of markets for managers and skilled workers and of a well-function-
ing social welfare system. 16 Since a substantial part of the individual's
wealth is tied to the corporation where he or she is employed, bankruptcy
may lead to personal disasters for employees. This exposure to risk has
provided managers as well as workers with strong incentives to find risk-
sharing arrangements.
While the risk reduction argument could have contributed to the
general acceptance of the financial keiretsu in Japanese society, it does
not explain their complicated structure or why they originally emerged on
the ashes of the zaibatsu. The pre-war groups were presumably formed for
other reasons than to diversify away management or employee risk. Further-
more, as Aoki (1988) recognizes, it is not clear that the bankruptcy risk
of firms of the size we find in the groups could be significant enough to
motivate these elaborate arrangements. Risk exposure could also be reduced
more efficiently, for example, by diversifying corporate investments into a
broader set of securities and to risks outside the industrial sector; 17 an
optimal risk-sharing arrangement would involve as many firms as possible,
14
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without any special role for reciprocal holdings concentrated among a well
defined set of firms; nor would it ustify the neat separation among the
groups, and their apparent strong sense of identification. We believe that
reciprocal holdings of shares serves primarily as an allocation of control
rights rather than of income rights.
Along this view, Aoki (1988) and Sheard (1986) submit that the
financial groupings should also be viewed as entrenchment mechanisms
defending incumbent management against hostile takeovers. Crossholdings of
shares may allow managers to increase the firm's capital base while
retaining control over the firm. The entrenchment hypothesis certainly
helps explain the low level of takeover activity in the Japanese financial
markets, in particular for firms belonging to the keiretsu groups. However,
even though fear of foreign purchases of undervalued Japanese companies was
voiced at the time the groups were formed, takeovers were not common in the
interim period before the groups reemerged after the war; in any case, the
strict regulation on capital flows would have by itself provided sufficient
protection. In addition, a purely defensive mechanism should be susceptible
to disintegration as subcoalitions realize that they can gain by selling
off their holdings in a particular firm to another management team which
values them more highly.
None of these previous explanations aims at explain the crossholdings
of shares in the financial keiretsu. These explanations also lack an
explicit model of what makes individual firms comply with the agreement to
cooperate, and how the arrangement is maintained over time. Furthermore,
entrenchment theories also do not explain why reciprocal shareholdings are
associated with other business transactions between the interlocked
parties. In the following section, we provide an explicit formal model of a
15
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underlying mechanism which may allow the keiretsu firms to credibly commit
to perform in transactions among themselves.
4 The Collective Enforcement Mechanism
Most complex economic transactions require some specifip investment
from the transacting parties, i.e., some investment is worth more within a
particular relationship than if sold on the market. When investments are
specific, there are quasi-rents to be allocated. Unconstrained ex post
bargaining over these rents gives rise to agency costs within the firm,
conflicts among firms and may in general distort ex ante investment. If
complete or comprehensive contracts specifying the payoffs and actions for
every conceivable state of nature could be written, there would be no such
ex post conflicts. However, specific investments are often hard to specify
in contracts. When contracts are incomplete, contracting parties may
mitigate conflicts by ex ante mechanisms constraining ex post bargaining
(Williamson, 1985). One alternative to unconstrained bargaining is to
delegate the right to make decisions not specified in the contract to one
of the parties, the residual control rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986). The
incomplete contract theory views allocation of control rights, along with
income rights, among a firm's suppliers of capital as specified in the
firm's financial contracts (Aghion & Bolton, 1988). Equity entitles its
holder to a proportional share in the firm's residual income and a vote at
the general shareholders meeting. Debt specifies a fixed payment and, if
this payment is not met, a transfer of control to creditors as well as a
share in the remaining value of the firm.
We suggest that the Japanese financial keiretsu may be interpreted as
a private collective enforcement mechanism mitigating conflicts between
16
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transacting firms, and between shareholders and management. Our explanation
focuses on the internal financial structure of the financial keiretsu as an
optimal allocation of control rights: the elaborate crossholdings of equity
and debt, the dominant role of the main bank in group financing and the
high debt-equity ratios. First, we generate a rationale for the crosshol-
dings of equity (Section 4.1). Secondly, we suggest an arrangement which
also includes crossholdings of debt and a concentrated creditor structure
(Section 4.2). Finally, a rationale for the strong reliance on external
financing through banks is developed.
We consider this allocation of control to provide a solution to two
moral hazard problems giving rise to underinvestment. Section 4.1 examines
the incentives offered to managers to exert effort when its firm is
profitable; the manager's interest is shown to be aligned by the arrange-
ment to that of its shareholders. Underinvestment arises because contracts
are incomplete and transacting parties care differently about specific
investments. Crossholdings of equity is shown to improve reciprocal
commitment among a group of transacting firms. In Section 4.2, the mutual
monitoring feature of equity crossholdings i insufficient to induce
managers to exert effort when the firm is approaching default and should be
liquidated. A conflict then arises between management and shareholders,
when the manager receiving early information about firm profitability. This
is shown to justify crossholdings of debt. The debt instrument here has two
functions: (i) to provide a signal about the bad state of nature (cf.
Harris & Raviv, 1990); (ii) to transfer control over assets in these states
to creditors (cf. Aghion & Bolton, 1988).
The context we describe is a simple transaction with mutual specific
investment plagued by a Prisoners' Dilemma which discourages cooperation in
the one-stage game. Once the interaction is known to last indefinitely,
17
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there is scope for collaboration through a reputation mechanism. However,
reputation will fail when individuals discount highly future payoff; then
the proposed crossholding arrangement is shown to improve commitment.18
4.1 Collective Enforcement Through Crossholdings of Equity
We consider an economy where public courts solely enforce control
rights and rights to share in verifiable revenues. A firm is characterized
by specific assets, with its capital structure defining the allocation of
revenues and control. We distinguish between managerial and corporate
control. Managerial control is defined as the entitlement to make produc-
tion decisions regarding the use of the firm's assets. Corporate control is
exercised by a shareholder or coalition of shareholders that own a majority
of the shares outstanding and can assign managerial control over assets to
a manager of choice. The firm's manager may or may not be a major share-
holder; if he does not hold shares, his compensation scheme, or salary, is
assumed to be directly proportional to the firm's profits.
The exercise of managerial control provides a manager with private
benefits.19 We can think of these benefits as various forms of on-the-job-
consumption, such as large expense accounts, golf club memberships and
general social prestige, associated with being in charge of the corpora-
tion. For simplicity, these benefits of control are assumed to be the main
component of the manager's compensation scheme. Managing the firm and
engaging in transactions with other firms require specific effort invest-
ments by the manager. The decision to exert effort is discrete (work,
shirk); work costs c, while shirking has no cost. Thus, a manager's
utility is a function of his wage and his private benefits are net of
effort costs. All agents discount future payoffs.
18
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Over time there are random opportunities for firms to transact with
each other. This opportunity may take the form of direct trading, or
pooling of research efforts, the value of which is enhanced by joint
relation-specific investment. The gains from trade may also arise from the
exchange of reliable information; or from coordination of actions vis-a-vis
third parties. Because contracts are incomplete, matched firms must bargain
for a division of collaboration benefits. For simplicity, we assume that
parties split these benefits evenly and focus on the effort investment and
the private benefits.
The basic stage game, i.e., the one-period game repeated in each
period is as illustrated in Figure 5. At first, transaction opportunities
are unveiled. Agents then choose whether o expend effort. After the
transaction has taken place, profits net of private benefits are distribut-
ed. Finally, a shareholders' meeting is held for each firm. Upon complaint
the coalition inspects the outcome and the effort investment. A voting
majority then decides to confirm or dismiss incumbent management.
Figure 5 Timing of Events in the Stage Game
Firms matched; Effort Output Profit Shareholders'
collaboration decision realized distri- meeting
decision bution
* I -I !i I . I..
A firm's return when it decides not to transact is 8. The profitabil-
ity of outside transactions is enhanced by effort investment by the
managers of the two firms: effort by both parties produces a, effort by one
agent produces B, and no effort on either side produces 0, where a > 28 >
B. Figure 6 describes the payoffs to each firm.
19
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Figure 6 Payoffs in the Stage Game
Second agent
Effort No effort
a/2-c, a/2-c B/2-c, B/2
Effort
First
agent
No effort
B/2, B/2-c 0, 0
Since collaboration is valuable, both managers would like to commit
themselves to exert effort. However, in the absence of credible precommit-
ment, the only pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game may be
Pareto-inefficient:20 both agents shirk, and their payoff is zero. Since
the payoff from own production e dominates the Nash equilibrium, rational
agents will refuse to enter in collaborative arrangements.
It is well known that when the stage game is repeated an infinite
number of times, cooperation can be sustained through the threat of loss of
reputation; the collective threat of refusing future transactions may
discourage opportunism. However, the threat of losing future collaboration
gains could be insufficient, when the agents' discount factor for future
payoffs falls short of a critical level (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). When
reputation is not sufficient, a stronger mechanism than loss of reputation
is necessary to support collaboration. In the rest of this section we
describe how a coalition of firms may credibly commit through a feasible
redistribution of ownership rights among themselves.
20
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Consider the following arrangement. Managers in a group of widely
held firms agree to purchase each others' shares or issue new shares to
each other until the combined holdings of the group exceed the full control
level (say, one half). A first effect of exchanging shares is profit-
sharing, so that all members internalize to some extent the profitability
of all other firms in the coalition. However, reciprocal holdings not only
redistribute net claims to residual income, but, more importantly, also
reallocate control rights; mutual stakes carry voting power on each firm's
shareholders meeting. By exchanging shares, each manager has made himself
vulnerable to a takeover by the rest of the coalition; the potential loss
of control rents implies a credible commitment in transactions with other
coalition members.
The complete arrangement includes certain implicit behavioral rules
in addition to the share exchange. Members should enter into collaborative
ventures offering gains from trade with other members; both parties must
then collaborate (expend effort). The arrangement also stipulates that if
any firm management deviates from the prescribed behavior, the rest of the
coalition must vote at the shareholders' meeting to oust the firm's manager
from his position. The final provision stipulates that if the coalition
fails to punish a deviating manager through expulsion, or alternatively, if
the coalition removes a manager from control without just cause, members
are no longer bound by an obligation to collaborate with each other (for a
more formal analysis, see the Appendix).
Under this coalition rule, the manager will not find it in his
interest to act in an opportunistic fashion in transactions with other
member firms, if the one period net gain from shirking, plus the present
value of the future income stream when not in charge, is less than the
value of profits and control benefits'enjoyed while in control. Note that
21
in this model profit sharing is not the main instrument to reduce the
incentive to act in an opportunistic way. Whereas the deviating firm, as a
partial crossholder, loses from the lower returns of the other firm, this
loss is shared by all coalition members; indeed, profit sharing may worsen
opportunism. Instead, the enforcement mechanism relies on the existence of
managerial private benefits which would be lost if control were transferred
to another agent. (In fact, when these benefits are large, the exchange of
control rights separate from income rights is sufficient to sustain
cooperation). The control rent sufficient to sustain the arrangement
decreases in the number of member firms; a minimum size of the coalition
may thus be necessary.
4.2 Hierarchical Enforcement Through Debt
In the previous section we showed that the interests of firm manage-
ment and its shareholders (i.e., the rest of the coalition) became aligned
through the threat of dismissal exercised by the mutual enforcement
mechanism. In circumstances where this threat is not effective, there will
be underinvestment in bilateral relations. In particular, when the firm is
unprofitable and should be liquidated, presumably the future benefits
associated with managing the firm vanish. Therefore, the threat of expul-
sion loses its effectiveness, and managers will prefer to shirk. As a
result, if the other members of the coalition could observe the state of
nature in the ailing firm, they would choose not to transact with it,
further worsening the firm prospects.
The collective enforcement mechanism therefore needs to be comple-
mented by another, state-contingent governance structure which discourages
the manager from shirking in states of'poor profitability. In principle, an
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explicit reward scheme for managers may provide such incentives; in
practice, financial compensation schemes for management have serious
limitations. In particular, such schemes have limited liability constrain-
ts; legal and wealth constraints prevent managers from being severely
fined. This reduces their effectiveness in bad states. Below we show how
debt financing and a certain distribution of debt claims may be used to
mitigate these problems associated with low performance states.21
Consider two transacting firms, A and B. At the time of contracting,
A's manager has private information about the profitability of the firm
(e.g., about costs or demand conditions for his firm's products). For
simplicity, we think of two states of nature, good and bad; a bad state of
nature implies that the firm should be closed down or thoroughly reorga-
nized. We assume, realistically, that management learns the state of the
firm before everyone else. Since management enjoys private benefits from
control, it has imperfect incentives to announce the state; firm closure or
thorough reorganization will erase management's control rents, possibly
because old management skills are worthless in the new structure. Now the
threat of expulsion is no longer effective. Based on his information
advantage about the state of nature, the manager of company A decides on
his level of effort investment. As long as the state of nature is good, the
manager exerts effort, but in bad states he will underinvest (in the sense
of taking a less efficient, less costly action).
To avoid poor incentives in unprofitable states, crossholdings within
the coalition extend to debt, both in the form of bank loans with the group
bank and trade credits among member firms. Unlike equity, debt stipulates
fixed payments which permits coalition members to obtain valuable informa-
tion; a failure to meet payment obligations is an early signal of the bad
state of nature (or possibly a lack of earlier effort by the manager)(cf.
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Harris & Raviv, 1990). Following default, the coalition assumes control and
decides to close down or reorganize the firm. Presumably, even reorgani-
zations require demotion or firing of current management, either because
management has not exerted sufficient effort or because of a reduced
competence in the reorganized firm. Extensive trade credits among member
firms allow frequent updating and mutual monitoring.
An objection to this view may be that such a dispersed creditor
structure associated with the use of diffused crosslending may threaten the
commitment properties of debt. To prolong its control over assets and to
extract more surplus, the management of the debtor firm may collude with
one or more creditors at the expense of the rest of the creditor, e.g., the
firm could choose to pay off some creditors but not others (Bulow & Shoven,
1978).22 Thus, the existence of more than one creditor may strengthen the
ex post bargaining power of the debtor. The enforcement mechanism associ-
ated with crossholdings of equity may mitigate this problem by preventing
individual trade creditors from settling separately with the firm in
distress; a manager who attempted this could be expelled from the crosshol-
ding arrangement. However, such settlements may not be observable to the
rest of the coalition, and collusion may be hard to prove. Since partial
settlements which postpone default are beneficial to both parties involved,
they will never be brought before the coalition unless they are observed by
a third party, e.g., another creditor.
In principle, to solve this conflict, debt may be distributed or
syndicated so that one creditor represents all or a large section of the
creditors and acts as an overall monitor. This pattern of debtholdings also\
makes the allocation of voting rights in default much more concentrated and
allows for a more hierarchical enforcement mode when firms are in financial
distress. The crossholding arrangement underlying the relations between the
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bank and the other member firms can also facilitate reorganization of the
firm in default by ensuring that all member firms contribute to the
recapitalization by forsaking part of their claims on the firm in default.
A final observation on the role of debt is in order. So far we have
analyzed the financial liabilities of keiretsu firms instruments mostly in
terms of control. However, crossholdings of debt and equity do not provide
new capital for investments. Suppose a member firm needs external funds to
finance its expansion; public issues of debt and equity may upset the
described allocation of control.23 To mitigate these problems, one coali-
tion member, the main bank, could serve as an intermediary between external
investors and group firms (cf. Diamond, 1984). The extensive use of debt
financing from the group bank, insurance company or trading company, means
that external funds can be raised without dispersing voting rights outside
the coalition; it also allows not to alter the relative importance of
member firms in the governance structure of the firm, at least until
default occurs.
This view of debt as mitigating problems of asymmetric information
echoes conclusions from several authors (see, for example, Harris & Raviv,
1990). In contrast, the notion of interfirm monitoring is, to our knowl-
edge, novel. In our view, the use of trade credits multiplies opportunities
for coalition members to verify the state of profitability of their trading
partners; this information permits collective monitoring and supports the
collective enforcement mechanism. However, a large intermediary may have
better incentives than dispersed shareholders or bondholders to enforce
discipline on a debtor firms (cf. Hoshi et al., 1990a). Here we add that
the concentration of voting rights in one lender may mitigate the multicre-
ditor problem. The dominant role of this intermediary in the keiretsu is
supported by crossholdings of debt, ensuring that the bulk of creditors
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belong to the coalition; and by crossholdings of equity, guaranteeing the
cooperation of creditors in the event of default. Thus, the group combines
two modes of enforcement: mutual enforcement by shareholders in good
states, and hierarchical enforcement led by the financial intermediary in
default states.
5 Empirical Evidence
We have formally modelled a private collective enforcement mechanism
resembling the financial keiretsu. The conclusion is that crossholdings
could be viewed as a hostage exchange, where contracting parties exchange
control rights in order to commit to cooperative behavior (Williamson,
1983).24 The model rests on a few crucial assumptions. This section dis-
cusses these assumptions and the predictions generated.
A crucial feature of the collective enforcement is that it remains
stable over time; sustained interaction is necessary for the mechanism to
police its own survival. In fact, in order to support long-term interac-
tion, the arrangement should have no definite terminal date. This is
consistent with the remarkable stability of the keiretsu groups; crosshold-
ing firms tend to retain constant stakes by subscribing to all stock issues
in proportion to their historical holdings, and equity positions sold off
by distressed firms are purchased proportionately by other members (Sheard,
1986).
Commitment to a coalition is facilitated when the group is well-
defined, and insiders and outsiders are easily distinguished. Indeed, the
boundaries of each keiretsu are very clearly drawn, and there is a strong
sense of identification. The core of the group is defined by membership in
the Presidents' Clubs. Interestingly, detailed statistics on ownership and
26
lending patterns within the groups are published yearly ensuring that
gradual changes in the allocation of voting rights will not go unnoticed.
In addition, recurrent campaigns promote the name of each keiretsu,
encouraging group cohesion (Gerlach, 1988).
The proposed enforcement mechanism relies on the existence of
significant managerial rents; these private benefits make the-threat of
expulsion effective. Evidence suggests that the private benefits associated
with top management positions in Japanese corporations are indeed substan-
tial (Clark, 1979). More generally, when managers stay in the same corpora-
tion for their entire careers, their skills become distinctly firm-specif-
ic. Indeed, the very features of Japan's economy invoked to motivate the
financial keiretsu as risk-sharing arrangements, i.e., the absence of the
managerial labor markets and a well-functioning social security system,
magnify the costs of expulsion (Aoki, 1984).
Our model suggests that supporting bilateral trade may be an impor-
tant function performed by the financial keiretsu. To motivate such an
elaborate structure of property rights, intragroup trade must be suffi-
ciently large. The data on such trade is poor, but overwhelming evidence
suggests that group members do prefer to transact with other firms of the
same keiretsu (see, for example, Clark (1979); Caves & Uekusa (1976);
Sheard (1988); Gerlach (1988); and Flath (1990)). The historical reemer-
gence of the groups from the pre-WW II zaibatsu, which had extensive
intrafirm trading, also lends support to the claim that enforcement of
bilateral trade is an important function of the groups.
Our rationale suggests that there is a minimum as well as a maximum X
size of the group; the group should be large enough to allow for repeated
interaction between several firms, but small enough to permit mutual
monitoring. In addition, to avoid conflicts of interest or antitrust
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action, firms should be in different industries. The size of member firms
should also preferably be of similar magnitude, since the proposed model
suggests an "inter-pares" relationship rather than an hierarchical struc-
ture or pure vertical integration. These predictions of the model fit well
with the structure of the groups and, in particular, with the fact that the
groupings are represented in most industries ("one-setism"), but only
rarely is more than one firm from each keiretsu in a particular industry
(Clark, 1979).25 Furthermore, as predicted in the model, the group's
combined holdings in each member firm are typically large enough to ensure
group control (see Table 2). No firm enjoys sufficient self-control to
always overcome the votes of the coalition, and no firm has a controlling
interest in another member firm. Thus, this coalition seems to capture some
of the benefits of vertical integration without giving rise to some of its
costs, such as loss of incentives and loss of information.
The discussion in Section 4.2 suggested that the enforcement mecha-
nism is particularly vulnerable when individual firms are in bad states of
nature, since the prospect of liquidation or thorough reorganization
weakens the enforcement power of expulsion; the manager would lose his
private benefits in any case. Through dependence on the main bank and
extensive use of trade credits, the coalition can achieve frequent monitor-
ing and will switch into a hierarchical enforcement mode when member firms
are in financial distress. When firms in financial distress have to be
reorganized, the reciprocal holdings of equity ensure collaboration under
the direction of the main lender. The following well-known example from the
reorganization of a firm in the Sumitomo group may illustrate how the
enforcement mechanism works in financial distress (Pascal & Rohlen, 1983).
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In the mid-1970s the Japanese company Toyo Kogyo, the producer of
Mazda cars, experienced serious difficulties. The company is a member of
the Sumitomo financial keiretsu. At the time, Sumitomo bank, the main bank
of Toyo Kogyo, held 16 per cent of the company's accumulated debt and 5 per
cent of its outstanding shares. In addition, Toyo Kogyo held 3 per-cent of
the equity capital in Sumitomo bank. Through bank managers working in the
company, the bank had access to detailed information. As the problems
became increasingly severe, the bank acted swiftly to remove management and
find successors. Sumitomo Bank was actively involved throughout the rescue
operation, for example, by designing adjustment plans and ensuring the
cooperation of other claimants, to a large extent trade creditors affiliat-
ed with the Sumitomo group.
Sheard (1986) provides numerous similar accounts of how member
companies have assisted in the restructuring of other group members, and in
the process absorbed considerable losses. The reorganization of member
firms in financial distress may be the most important aspect of the
financial keiretsu; evidence suggests that bankruptcy is virtually non-
existent within the groups whereas it is common among independent companies
(Hoshino, 1984). The empirical results provided by Hoshi et al. (1990a)
also indicate that costs of financial distress are lower in firms belonging
to the financial keiretsu than in independent firms.
The arrangement we describe is in agreement with the observation made
by Hoshi et al. (1991) that members of the financial groupings have been
less liquidity-constrained than firms outside these arrangements. Their
explanation offered by Hoshi et al. relies on bank monitoring. We have
suggested a mechanism which makes commitments to truthful information
exchange and future repayments credible. In our view, centralized monitor-
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ing without the collaboration of trading partners or the ability to enforce
contractual agreements is less effective.
Finally, the model suggests the existence of a body, a superboard
where all firms in the group are represented, with the potential of
coordinating enforcement. The dispersion of ownership shares in the
coalition are such that the general shareholders' meeting of the individual
member firms will have a similar composition as the superboard. This
implies that opportunistic actions can occur only at the managerial level
but not at the level of corporate control, as long as the coalition
controls the majority in each firm. On the other hand, there is no need for
frequent meetings of the shareholders' meeting to enforce control changes
as long as the firms comply with mutual arangements. The keiretsu firms
maintain many intermediate and high level meetings among firm, among which
the Presidents' Clubs, to coordinate action or exhert mutual monitor-
ing. 262 7 In general, our focus on the enforcement aspect of the finan-
cial keiretsu may tend to exaggerate the extent of coordination within
these groups. While the financial keiretsu are an important aspect of the
Japanese economic system, their influence on the daily operation of
individual members is limited. Group intervention and subsequent dismissals
of managers are relatively rare when the firm is not in default. However,
intervention is common in distressed firms (see, for example, Sheard
(1986)). Furthermore, an evaluation of the importance of a particular
enforcement scheme should not be based on how often punishment is carried
out; in equilibrium an efficient mechanism would never need to punish. This
is clearly unrealistic; in a model with greater uncertainty, opportunistic X
actions and punishment may occur in some circumstances. In any case, we
would argue that the significance of powerful enforcement schemes may be
considerable, even when they are seldom utilized (cf. nuclear deterrence);
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the crossholding arrangement should be regarded as a base upon which
relationships between coalition members can be developed.
The proposed arrangement is always at least as strong as that of a
mechanism based on loss of reputation, i.e., loss of future benefits from
future transactions. Our punishment scheme contains one more element, the
loss of private benefits through expulsion. A parallel can be. drawn to the
exit and voice mechanisms analysed by Hirschman (1970); "exit" corresponds
to the discontinuation of trade and "voice" to the active interference
through expulsion. Of course, this characterization does not capture the
full richness of the "voice"-mechanism as developed by Hirschman.
6 Implications and Concluding Remarks
Our interpretation of the structure of the financial keiretsu as a
private enforcement mechanism is compatible with several previous ratio-
nales advanced in the literature, in particular with explanations that
focus on transaction efficiency within the group. The suggested mechanism
may also enforce agreements to defend individual members against takeovers
by outsiders, as well as to provide risk-sharing; the financial keiretsu
can police their own survival.2 8 We view our contribution as providing an
explicit mechanism to explain how relationships among coalition members are
sustained over time.
The rationale offered here most closely resembles a view held in the
non-economic literature where reciprocal holdings are interpreted as
implicit long-term agreements and expressions of mutual trust, so-called
relational contracting (Dore, 1983). The exchange of equity holdings is
then only part of a broader business relationship between member firms
involving, for example, the extension of loans or the provision of insur-
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ance services; "shareholdings are the mere expression of their relation-
ship, not the relationship itself" (Clark, 1979). However, as economists we
are not satisfied with the assumption of collective will and inherent
reliability. Rather, we view collaboration as an (ex ante) desirable
outcome of relationships among self-interested parties, supported by a
mechanism for credible commitment. Our interpretation provides a theoreti-
cal mechanism for the support of such long-term relations, where the causal
relation goes from crossholdings to trust, and not vice versa. Paradoxical-
ly, the existence of an effective enforcement mechanism may have allowed
the relationships between member firms to develop in many dimensions,
making the control aspect virtually invisible.
The corporate groupings could be viewed as an example of the role of
groups in Japanese society. Some researchers argue that group membership
plays the same role in Japan as individual self-realization and private
property rights do in the Western world (Hirschmeier & Yui, 1979). Our
model could be read as a formalization of the implicit punishment structure
supporting group socialization, and in particular the importance of peer
pressure, here managers of other group members, in determining behavior.2 9
However, rather than contrasting a self-centered against a group-centered
view of the individual, we suggest a line of reasoning that is compatible
with both: consensus can be achieved by self-interested individuals under
implicit threats of expulsion.
The rationale put forward here may also provide a reasonable inter-
pretation of the significance of shareholdings in Japan. Many observers
have found it hard to reconcile the seemingly negligible role of the
individual shareholder and the importance of managers in Japanese business,
with the potential power of shareholders if they act in concert. Statements
such as "Japanese companies belong to managers and not to shareholders"
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(Clark, 1979) could be reinterpreted as implying that Japanese managers de
facto are shareholders, through direct and indirect holdings by the firms
they manage. Yet, the intricate arrangements of the financial keiretsu have
allowed a separation of corporate and managerial control; the group only
intervenes when there is deviation by individual members. The financial
keiretsu have in fact become a crucial element in an extreme form of
managerialism, where managers have virtual insurance against hostile
takeovers and can choose their heirs from within their own organizations.
The interpretation of the financial keiretsu as a private enforcement
mechanism has major implications for Japanese society. We have suggested
that such a mechanism could reduce the problem of underinvestment in
specific assets that is associated with contractual incompleteness; the
feasible set of contracts is enlarged through the creation of a commitment
mechanism. However, the mechanism could also be utilized to support
entrenchment through a collective takeover defence. Entrenchment may or may
not be associated with inefficiency depending on the ability of the
keiretsu to mitigate agency costs through internal monitoring.
Even if the financial keiretsu arrangement is beneficial for group
members, it may potentially be costly for outsiders and, on balance, for
society as a whole. The extensive use of informal, private mechanisms
hampers the evolution of case law, and thus of the formal legal system.
Furthermore, the groups promote insider trading which is likely to have a
negative impact on the functioning of capital markets; insider shareholders
have considerable influence over corporate decisions in Japan, whereas
outside shareholders are virtually powerless. However, the keiretsu
arrangement could also be viewed as an interesting answer to the question
of "who monitors the monitors", i.e., which institution or individual is
ultimately responsible for monitoring the use of assets. Our rationale
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suggests that mutual monitoring may be more successful, and less disrup-
tive, than a form of monitoring relying on higher authority, which may
induce a loss of incentives among subordinates.
Whether the financial keiretsu are beneficial to society as a whole
is an open issue, but the groups have undoubtedly demonstrated significant
survival properties in the Japanese context. Though organized.differently,
bank-centered corporate groupings can be found on the European continent.
This raises the question of why similar arrangements have not emerged in
the United States. There may be several explanations. First, even if US
legislation does not explicitly prohibit crossholdings of shares, political
interest groups and anti-trust authorities would most certainly have
reacted to the emergence of financial groupings with extensive reciprocal
ownership between members. 30 Moreover, the Japanese commercial banks
played an active role in recreating the zaibatsu by, for example, purchas-
ing shares on the market and reselling them to corporate and institutional
investors. In the United States, banking regulation prevents commercial
banks from strategic holdings of corporate stock, and insolvency law deters
bank involvement in individual firms.
The relative importance of the functions performed by the financial
keiretsu changes over time in response to the general economic situation
and to the specific needs of individual corporations. When firms are very
profitable and do not need external financing, the likelihood of financial
distress diminishes, and so the need for corporate reorganizations.
Similarly, rapidly growing firms expanding into new geographical markets
are likely to diversify their trading relationships, thus weakening the
role of the financial keiretsu in supporting bilateral trade. Indeed, there
are signs of weakening of the keiretsu as Japanese firms become increasing-
ly globalized.
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APPENDIX: A FORMAL MODEL OF THE CROSSHOLDING ARRANGEMENT
This appendix develops a formal modelof the crossholding arrangement
discussed in Section 4.1. The model relies on infinite interaction between
agents. We know from the Folk Theorem that in such a context just about any
equilibrium can be sustained provided that agents are sufficiently patient;
thus there is a fundamental indeterminacy. The multiplicity of equilibria
is true also for our model. However, in this appendix we generate necessary
conditions for a particular collaborative equilibrium on which contracting
parties agree ex ante. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this equilibrium
dominates a pure reputation equilibrium.
Consider a set of N + 1 firms, indexed by i - 1, .. N + 1, and n
agents, indexed by j 1, .. n, where n > N + 1; so there are more poten-
tial managers than firms. Output is enhanced in all firms by effort by
their managers. The manager either exerts effort (work) or shirks.
Working costs c, while leisure comes free. From the exercise of managerial
control the manager enjoys a noncontractible benefit equal to a fraction a
> 0 of output. For simplicity, contractible compensation is assumed
negligible in comparison to the control benefit. In addition, no manager
personally owns shares in any firm; only firms and perhaps small, passive
investors do.
Agents' utility functions are linear in return and effort. Define
Aij to be the proportion of shares of firm i held by firm j. The payoff to
a manager in charge, when indicates the profit from the firm's assets,
equals
U(w,c) a - c when effort is expended
·U(w,O) = a when no effort is expended
38
11-_1 - 1- --11111
--s-----·-·.· *.
while for a 'passive' shareholder indexed by i, who enjoys no benefit from
control but exerts no effort, the return on a stake piJ in the jth firm is
U(r,O) - ij (1 - a)r. We assume that ae - c > 0, so managers prefer to be
in control when the firm is engaged in own production (where - ) even if
they incur effort costs. All agents discount future payoffs at the rate 6
per period.
Consider the manager's incentives to provide effort in a one period
transaction with another firm. There is ex post symmetric information, so
that the effort choice is observable by the other shareholders. The timing
of events and payoffs are as illustrated in the text (see Figure 1 and 2).
Since each manager receives a benefit equal to a fraction a of the surplus,
but has to invest specific resources to acost c to achieve efficient
production, his incentives are poor if a(a/2) - c < a(B/2). Thus, under
even milder restrictions than those listed in footnote 19, we have a
classic Prisoner's Dilemma: both agents shirk regardless of what the other
does, and they both earn a payoff of zero. Because this outcome is
anticipated, both agents prefer to engage in own production, which yields a
net positive return ae - c. As a result, potential gains from transactions
will be lost.
Consider now the crossholding arrangement. In the initial stage,
each firm i exchanges own shares for minority stakes ij, j i, in the
other N companies, to the point where self-control (the amount of voting
rights in the firm controlled by its manager) is zero, i.e. pi - 0 for all
i.31 For simplicity, let ij - 1/N for all j different from i; each firm
gets the same minority share in the ith firm. This allocation of voting
rights makes each manager vulnerable to a takeover by the other N agents.
Specifically, this threat is complemented by certain behavioral rules.
Following any deviation by an individual manager from collaborative
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behavior, the rest of the coalition will oust him from his position in
charge of the firm. 32 Another implicit provision stipulates that if the
coalition fails to dismiss a deviating manager, or alternatively removes a
manager from control without just cause, the arrangement collapses.
Following such a collapse, members are not bound anymore by an obligation
to collaborate with each other. In what follows, we establish- the condi-
tions under which the threat of expulsion by the rest of the coalition can
enforce collaboration in transactions among coalition members such that the
punishment is credible ex post.
The manager will not find in his interest to act opportunistically if
the one period net gain from shirking in transactions with other firms is
less than the capitalized value of future\control benefits. By collaborat-
ing, in the future the manager will earn:
6[a( + 7(a/2 - 8)) - c] / (1 - 6)
from his stake in the firm he manages where denotes the probability of
being matched in a particular period. If instead he deviates, she saves the
cost of effort c, minus his share of lower profits. Thus it does not pay to
deviate and be dismissed as long as
ba( + (a/2 - 8)) - 6c > (1 - 6) c + (1 - 6)a( - )/2
c
a >> * 
6(8 + (a/2 - 8)) - (1 - 6)(B - a)/2
Thus the payoff to shirking is lower, the larger is the managerial
control benefit a. There are two reasons: directly because with a large
rent on firm assets, the manager internalizes more the loss of joint
venture profits; but more importantly, because a dismissal implies the loss
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of higher future benefits. For punishment to be effective, it must not rely
on a noncredible threat. In other words, following a deviation, it must :be
in the interest of a majority of shareholders to agree to dismiss the
manager. Next we examine their incentive to do so.
The choice for each shareholder at the meeting of the ith firm is a
vote of confidence or dismissal for its manager. Since the crossholding
equilibrium relies on a collective vote, we need to rule out the possibili-
ty of deviations from majority sub-coalitions. We do so by verifying under
what conditions a majority subcoalition does less well in a deviation than
in the collaborative equilibrium. Note that this is more restrictive that
the previous condition, since we do not require the deviating manager to be
better off from deviating.
First, we establish whether a deviant manager can block her dismissal
by bribing a majority of shareholders. We allow a deviating manager can
negotiate with other shareholders, and side transfers might take place.
When n* cross-shareholders are necessary to enforce the transfer of con-
trol, a number of members n n* must have the incentive to do so. By
stipulation of the arrangement, failure to punish a deviation will lead to
a dissolution of the coalition, leading to loss of benfits from trade.
Consequently, for punishment to be the optimal choice of the majority, it
must be that for the subcoalition the loss of future collaboration gains
outweighs the gain from deviation (including possible side payments by the
deviant manager).
The maximum bribe that a manager will be willing to pay to avoid
removal is given by the gain from deviation, plus the private control
benefit he stand to lose from dismissal, minus his share of loss of
collaboration profits due to the collapse of the arrangement:
MB a(B - )/2 + c + 6[ae - c]/(l - 6) - 6[a(a/2 - e)]/(l - 6)
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A blocking subcoalition must be sufficiently large to ensure that
their pooled votes can form a majority at the shareholders' meeting; it:
must contain at least n* members, where
n*[1/N] 2 h --> n*- (N+1)/2
If this subcoalition blocks punishment, its members lose their share
of the loss of future trading gains. Therefore, punishment will not be
blocked as long as:
6[ae - c] 6an(a/2 - ) 6n*a(a/2 - 8)
a( - a)/2 + c + <
1-6 1-6 1 - 6
which can be rewritten either as a constraint on the size of a:
2 c
a** 
6(N+2)n(a/2 - 8) - 68 - (1 - 6)(B - a)/2
where a** is the threshold private benefit necessary to ensure that punish-
ment is credible. The maximum value for the control rent is decreasing in
N. The intuition is that the larger the control rent, the larger is the
compensation to the majority subcoalition necessary to avoid expulsion.
A general result is that a minimum size of the private benefit of
control is necessary to support collaboration. Furthermore, an increased
coalition size N in general contributes to support the crossholding
equilibrium, since it increases the number of agents necessary for a
majority coalition and thus the total loss of future profits to a deviating
subcoalition disrupting the arrangement.
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We contrast now the effectiveness of the crossholding arrangement
with an alternative punishment device, loss of reputation (for the general
result, see Perotti, 1991). Consider a continuum of possible economies
indexed by their discount factor 6, where 6 E [0,1]. We show below that the
minimum value of 6 required to sustain a reputation equilibrium (denoted
6E) is higher than the corresponding minimum value necessary to sustain a
collaboration equilibrium (denoted 6co). We have the following proposition.
Proposition: The crossholding mechanism dominates the public reputa-
tion mechanism, in the sense that it sustains efficient transacting in some
econmies where the threat of reputation loss fails.
Proof: The condition for the threat of reputation loss to be effec-
tive is that
a( - a)/2 + c + 68/(1 - 6) - 6[ae + a(a/2 - 8)]/(l - 6)
2c + (B - a)
==> 
6 E >
2c + a(B - a) + 2an(a/2 - e)
From the earlier analysis we can derive the minimum discount rate
such that crossholding arrangements can support collaboration
2c + a(B - a)
==> 
6
co >
a(B - a) + 2a(8 + (a/2 - e))
Comparing the two expressions, we see that 6co is lower than 6 when
2a[ + (a/2 - 8)] - c > (a/2 - 8); this is ensured by our assumption
that the net benefit from control over an independent firm net of effort
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cost, i.e., the control rent, is positive (a > c). If that were not true,
noone would want to be manager.
Q.E.D.
In conclusion, the crossholding mechanism dominates the reputation
mechanism, since it can support collaboration in a broader set of circum-
stances. Our interpretation is that noncontractual enforcement arrangement
structured for indefinite interaction dominates a purely contractual
mechanism based on voluntary renewal of trading links, because the commit-
ment property of the former is stronger.
44
-_- ------ ~ ~ _ _ · 1 111~1111
_  _ ___ ------- --------- ·---·-----· ---- -
1. Obviously, a court will not enforce agreements which run against some
body of law or which stipulate anticompetitive collusive behavior. See Reuter
(1984) for a discussion of the Mafia as a private enforcement mechanism when
agreements cannot be enforced by law.
2. Legal informality is in no way confined to Japan; any economic system
combines informal private and public conflict resolution with formal
enforcement based on contractual agreements between private parties, and
enforced by public courts. In fact, private enforcement is the predominant
form of conflict resolution.
3. The reasons for this unwillingness to litigate have been the subject
of considerable debate. Observers seem to agree that there is an inherent bias
against litigation in Japanese ethics, and suing parties suffer reputational
losses. However, Japan's level of litigation, while lower, is not as conspicu-
ous when compared to countries in Western Europe. Haley (1978), in his
discussion of "the reluctant litigant", identifies a number of inefficiencies
in the court system that systematically discourage litigation. Ramseyer
(1986), on the other hand, attributes the phenomenon partially to the
predictability of the Japanese courts, i.e., the absence of litigation is a
sign of a well-functioning system. In addition, the government provides a
number of informal mechanisms for dispute resolution, such as institutional-
ized mediation.
4. In 1949, more than 69 per cent of corporate shares listed on the Tokyo
stock exchange were held by individuals. By 1984 this share had fallen to 27
per cent.
5. Nakatani (1984) states that, out of 859 companies on the first section
of the Tokyo stock exchange in 1981, as many as 719 (84 per cent) can be
considered as members of such a group. This number differs somewhat across
sources depending on the criteria used for group classification. According to
Nakatani, the six largest financial groupings - Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo,
Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kangyo and Sanwa - counted no less than 546 (76 per cent) of
these firms. Among the 140 companies judged to be more or less independent,
only 54 lacked known group connections. Among the independent firms were the
large steel producer Shin Nippon Steel, Hitachi and a number of smaller firms
with predominantly local connections. The companies belonging to financial
keiretsu are on average larger than the independent counterparts and were
overrepresented in heavy industry.
6. Cross-holdings of shares here refers to reciprocal ownership. The
Japanese term, "kabushiki mochiai", denotes reciprocal holdings, but it has
a wider meaning of mutual help, shared interdependence and stability (Gerlach,
1987).
7. Board members are predominantly internally recruited. On average, 90
per cent of the board members of a particular firm are employees (Ballon,
1978).
8. Membership in these clubs is often used as a criterion for the
classification of group affiliation. This membership is not clearly defined;
there are no dues or authorized lists of members.
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9. Reliable statistics on internal group trade are not available.
According to Japan's Fair Trade Commission, 20 per cent of all sales
transactions (above 1 mn yen) and 12 per cent of purchases (above 1 mn yen)
of manufacturing firms were to and from fellow keiretsu members, respectively
(Flath, 1990). However, while indicative of a preference for intragroup
transactions, these figures underestimate the significance of intragroup trade
since they do not include trade with affiliates and subsidiaries of keiretsu
members.
10. The main bank for firms listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange with bank borrowings in 1980 was the number-one or number-two
shareholder in 39 per cent of firms, and among the top five shareholders in
72 per cent of firms (Sheard, 1986).
11. A brief look at the trading statistics from the Tokyo stock exchange
illustrates this phenomenon. In 1983, about 20 per cent of the corporate
stocks were owned by banks, but these institutions accounted for less than 2
per cent of the total transactions volume. The corresponding figures for non-
financial corporations were 25 and 7 per cent, respectively (Nomura
Securities, 1985).
12. Trade credits contributed 18 per cent of gross financing (unweighted)
of nonfinancial enterprises 1970-1985. 1The corresponding figures for the
United States and West Germany were 8.4 and 2.2 per cent, respectively (Mayer,
1990).
13. Although this explanation suggests economic distortions, this is not
necessarily true. For instance, when entry into new areas entails large
initial sunk costs, this arrangement will provide member firms with a minimum
customer base encouraging them to invest. If, in addition, each keiretsu has
a similar role, the implication will be more rapid entry of several
competitors, with ambiguous, but quite possibly favorable effects on
competition.
14. Hodder (1987) bases his observations on case studies and more
impressionistic data but reaches similar conclusions.
15. In principle, investors can diversify their holdings at least as well
as corporations; therefore, risk reduction by management through corporate
diversification is often believed to be self-serving.
16. Aoki (1988) suggests that the risk-sharing role of the Japanese
groupings may have been less important after 1975.
17. Horiuchi et al. (1988) provide an empirical test of the risk-sharing
hypothesis. Even though their study focuses on the relationship between the
main bank and member firms and not the wider intragroup relations, their data
put this rationale into question. In situations where firms change main bank
affiliation, the bank-customer relationship is not significantly related to,
the risk that banks and companies face. Moreover, if groups were truly
designed to share risk, member firms would be able to compensate for changes
in operating profits by adjusting financial expenses. However, the correlation
between financial expenses and operating profits of specific companies are not
significantly related to the degree of dependence on the main bank.
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18. In principle, there are multiple equilibria in such a game. We assume
an initial stage where all agents agree on a set of behavioral rules, which
support the collaboration equilibrium.
19. These non-verifiable benefits from control derive from the broad
discretion exercised by managers who daily take allocative decisions. In
Grossman and Hart (1986), such benefits accrue to the owner of the vertically'
integrated firm. In our economy, there may not be a unique owner, but there
is only one manager; because of this separation of ownership and control, it
is natural to postulate that the private benefit of control over the asset
accrues to the managers (cf. Hart, 1988). The private benefits could also be
thought of as an efficiency wage which is well in excess of compensation in
alternative employment.
20. More precisely, the equilibrium is inefficient when the following
conditions for a classic Prisoner's Dilemma are satisfied:
Hla) a - c > 2 8 > B - c
(Collaboration is Pareto-superior to independent use of assets when both
agents exert effort, and Pareto-dominated if neither does)
Hlb) a/2 - c < B/2
(If the other agent works, it is optimal to shirk)
Hlc) B/2 - c < 0
(It does not pay to be the only one to work).
21. We focus on the underinvestment problem in bilateral transactions
between two coalition members. The argument could be applied also to the
mitigation of agency costs in own production when default is the outcome of
a failure by management to exert proper effort or take the most efficient but
more costly action.
22. This is the "common pool problem" where an individual creditor has
incentives to settle with the debtor at the expense of the creditors as a
collective (Jackson, 1988).
23. Moreover, such issues may have poor commitment properties; group firms
may be viewed as favoring members of their own groups at the expense of
outside investors.
24. The traditional static hostage model suffers from opportunism problems
once the transaction is completed: how do we know that the hostages really
will be turned over, and once they have been turned over what guarantees that
the other party will stick to the agreement? In our analysis, this is resolved
by relying on an infinite horizon of interaction. x
25. If we assume that a firm wants to maximize the opportunity of being
matched with other group members in the future and avoid transactions outside
the group, the "one-setism" feature may, in fact, be generated endogenously
in our model. Assume that a firm is less likely to transact with a competitor
than with a firm from a different industry than its own. the group consists
of a number of firms in different industries. If a new member in a industry
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previously not represented in the group joins, the likelihood for the
individual group member of inside transactions increases. However, if the new
member comes from an industry already represented in the group, the likelihood
of being matched will go down for the group member in that industry; there
will now be two firms instead of one supplying other group members with the
same products.
26. Aoki (1988) suggests that the Presidents' Clubs, among other things,
settle conflicts between individual group members. This is in line with our
rationale suggesting that the financial keiretsu mitigate conflicts.
27. The boards of individual keiretsu firms may not reflect the distribution
of control suggested by the crossholding arrangement; as previously described
they are dominated by managers from the firm. To the extent that these boards
are responsible for hiring and firing top management, our rationale would
imply that actual control is different from that implied by the nominal
representation on the board of directors. We would argue that the threat of
a concerted effort from a majority shareholder would be sufficient to enforce
the coalitions's code of behavior.
28. It should be noted, however, that if takeover defence were the primary
motive for the existence of the extensive rossholdings, the groups should be
expected to be less stable than observed. If a rival offers the coalition all
or a majority of their holdings in a particular firm, it is not clear why the
coalition would not accept it. An offer to buy the entire portfolio of an
individual coalition member has limited effects on the arrangement and thus
should not be resisted by the rest of the coalition.
29. In recent work, Kandel & Lazear (1989) model the influence of peer
pressure on the level of effort exerted by members of an organization. Kandel
& Lazear also demonstrate how a discontinuous punishment scheme, such as the
exclusion of members, under certain conditions may be as effective as an
elaborate non-linear incentive scheme.
30. Roe (1990) provides a thorough analysis of the role of interest groups
in the emergence of financial regulation and corporate capital structure in
the United States (see also Jensen (1989)).
31. This assumption is reasonable, since the manager does not own any
shares. In any event, it is not crucial, as long as the degree of self-control
is sufficiently low.
32. Since managers do not own shares, substituting a manager who has
deviated does not reduce the number of firms in the coalition.
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